Abstract. We consider a contracting problem in which a principal hires an agent to manage a risky project. When the agent chooses volatility components of the output process and the principal observes the output continuously, the principal can compute the quadratic variation of the output, but not the individual components. This leads to moral hazard with respect to the risk choices of the agent. Using a recent theory of singular changes of measures for Ito processes, we formulate a principal-agent problem in this context, and solve it in the case of CARA preferences. In that case, the optimal contract is linear in these factors: the contractible sources of risk, including the output, the quadratic variation of the output and the cross-variations between the output and the contractible risk sources. Thus, like sample Sharpe ratios used in practice, path-dependent contracts naturally arise when there is moral hazard with respect to risk management. We also provide comparative statics via numerical examples, showing that the optimal contract is sensitive to the values of risk premia and the initial values of the risk exposures.
Introduction
In many cases managers are in charge of managing exposures to many different types of risk, and they do that dynamically. A well-known example is the management of a portfolio of many risky assets. Nevertheless, virtually all existing continuous-time principal-agent models with moral hazard and continuous output value process suppose that the agent controls the drift of the output process, and not its volatility components. The drift is what the agent controls in the seminal models of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) , henceforth HM (1987) , in which utility is drawn from terminal payoff, and of Sannikov (2008) , in which utility is drawn from inter-temporal payments. In fact, in those papers the moral hazard cannot arise from volatility choice anyway when there is only one source of risk (one Brownian motion), because if the principal observes the output process continuously, there is no moral hazard with respect to volatility choice: the volatility can be deduced from the output's quadratic variation process. However, when the agent manages many non-contractible sources of risk, his choices of exposures to the individual risk sources cannot be deduced from the output observations, even continuous.
One reason this problem has not been studied is the previous lack of a workable mathematical methodology to tackle it. When the drift of an Ito process is picked by the agent, this can be formulated as a Girsanov change of the underlying probability measure to an equivalent probability measure, and there is an extensive mathematical theory behind it. However, changing volatility components requires singular changes of measures, a problem that, until recently, has not been successfully studied. We take advantage of recent progress in this regard, and use the new theory to formulate carefully the principal-agent problem.
In principle, our approach can be applied to any utility functions. However, with terminal payment only, as in HM (1987) , the only tractable case is the one with exponential (CARA) utility functions. In the CARA case, our optimal contract is linear, but not only in the output process as in HM (1987) , rather, also in these factors: the output, its quadratic variation, the contractible sources of risk (if any), and the cross-variations between the output and the risk sources. Thus, the use of path dependent contracts naturally arises when there is moral hazard with respect to risk management. In particular, our model is consistent with the use of the sample Sharpe ratio when compensating portfolio managers.
In case there are two sources of risk, and at least one is observable/contractible, the first best is attained, because there are two risk factors and at least two contractible variables, the output and at least one risk source; however, to attain the first best, the optimal contract makes use of the quadratic and cross-variation factors.
In case of two non-contractible sources of risk, we solve numerically CARA examples with a quadratic cost function. In this case, first best is generically not attainable. Numerical computations show that the optimal contract's sensitivity to output is never lower than in the first-best case, and that the optimal contract is sensitive to extreme values of risk premia and initial values of the risk exposures.
An early continuous-time paper on volatility moral hazard is Sung (1995) . However, in that paper moral hazard is a result of the output being observable only at the terminal time, and not because of multiple sources of risk. Consequently, the optimal contract is still a linear function of the terminal output value only. While we know of no other papers dealing with volatility moral hazard in continuous time, there has been work on the first best, risk-sharing problems of such type. The first paper on the subject is Ou-Yang (2003) , who shows that first-best is attainable by contracts that depend on the final value of the output and a "benchmark" portfolio, in an economy in which all the sources of risk (all the risky assets available for investment) are observable. Some of his results are extended in Cadenillas, Cvitanić and Zapatero (2007) , who show that, if the market is complete, first-best is attainable even by contracts that depend only on the final value of the output. Thus, second best may be different from first best only if the market is not complete. In our model first best and second best are indeed different for almost all parameter configurations, in the CARA case with quadratic cost. One way of presenting our results is that, while the existing literature analyzes in which cases first best is attainable, we show that in the markets that contain at least two non-contractible sources of risk and that are incomplete (in particular, if the cost function is not zero), first best is not attainable, and we compute second best. * We present the model in Section 2, describe, in Section 3, the contracting problem and the approach to solving it, we solve the CARA case with quadratic penalty in Section 4, and conclude with Section 5. The remaining proofs are provided in Appendix.
The Model
We would like to have a model for the output process B 1 of the form is that of an output process dependent on the agent's choice of the volatility vector v and on his choice of the level of effort a. One example would be that of portfolio management, in which the agent/manager only controls the process v and a is set to zero. In the terminology of portfolio theory, σ corresponds to the volatility matrix of the underlying risky assets, b is the vector of their risk premia, and v can be interpreted as the vector of dollar-holdings in the risky assets. As another example, when d = 1, v is fixed and the agent only controls a only, we get the classical continuoustime principal-agent model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) . More generally, B 1 is an output * A recent paper Wong (2013) considers the moral hazard of risk-taking in a model different from ours: the horizon is infinite, as in Sannikov (2008) , and, while the volatility is fixed, the agent's effort influences the arrival rate of Poisson shocks to the output process. Lioui and Poncet (2013) , like us, consider a principal-agent problem in which the volatility is chosen by the agent. Theirs is a first-best framework, but unlike the above mentioned two papers, they assume that the agent has enough bargaining power to require that the contract be linear in the output and in a benchmark, and to fix the coefficients of the corresponding linear function.
process driven by a d-dimensional Brownian motion, and in which changing v changes both the drift ("return") and the volatility ("risk") in a linear manner, while changing a only modifies the drift. In addition to the output process B 1 , we may want to allow contracts based on additional observable risk factors W 1 , . . . ,W d 0 , for some 0 ≤ d 0 < d. For example, S t = S 0 + µ S t + σ S W 1 t might be a model for the observable stock index.
As is routinely done in contract theory, for sake of tractability we would like the agent to change v and a by changing the probability measure over the underlying probability space. When, as in standard continuous-time contract models, the effort is present only in the drift, changing measures is done by the means of the Girsanov theorem. Until recently, though, such a tool had not been available for singular changes of measure, that are needed when changing volatility. In this paper we use results from the recent theory of singular changes of measures for Itô processes to formulate rigorously the principal-agent problem in which the agent chooses the volatility process v. We first need to introduce some notation and the framework.
We work on the canonical space Ω of continuous functions on [0, T ], with its Borel σ -algebra F . The d−dimensional canonical process is denoted B, and F := (F t ) 0≤t≤T is its natural filtration. Denote F = F T , and let P 0 denote the d−dimensional Wiener measure on Ω. Thus, B is a d−dimensional Brownian motion under P 0 . Let M(Ω) be the set of probability measures on (Ω, F ) and
In Appendix we show how to construct the model (2.1). More precisely, we prove the following.
Proposition 2.1. There exists a subset A of R d -valued, F-predictable processes a that includes bounded processes, such that 0 = a 1 = . . . = a d 0 , and such that for every pair (v, a) ∈ H 2 (P 0 ) × A there exists a probability measure P v,a and a d-dimensional P v,a -Brownian motion W a , independent of v, such that
Moreover, for every such measure P v,a , there exist processes v P v,a (B · ) and a P v,a (B · ) such that
Thus, the process B 1 has the desired dynamics (in weak sense) of the agent's output, and processes B 2 , . . . , B d 0 +1 represent the observable sources of risk. We denote by P the set of the measures P v,a . Moreover, for any P ∈ P and any t ∈ [0, T ] we denote by P(t, P) the set of measures P ∈ P which are equal to P on F t .
In the following, we will sometimes use the notation P v,a ∈ P when working with a specific measure P v,a ∈ P, and sometimes the notation P ∈ P, for generic such measures.
The Contracting Problem
We assume that the agent is paid only at the final time T in the amount ξ T , and the utility functions are exponential: for the principal
and for the agent
where k is a (convex) cost function.
First-best contract
Given a "bargaining-power" parameter ρ > 0, the first-best problem is defined as, with
The first order condition for ξ T is then
With the considered exponential utility functions, we obtain
Thus, the optimal first best contract is linear in the final value B T of the output. Plugging back into the optimization problem and using (6.6), we get that it is equivalent to
where E denotes the usual Doléans-Dade stochastic exponential † and
Under appropriate technical conditions (that guarantee that the expectation of the stochastic exponential is equal to one), Girsanov theorem can be applied and the above can be written as
for some probability measure P equivalent to P.
Conjecturing that v and a are deterministic under the optimal measure, the optimization above can be reduced to the pointwise maximization of the function g σ (·, ·). In our benchmark example below we set a P t ≡ 0 and σ = I d , the identity matrix, and we set k(x, y) =
The maximum is then attained for v FB ∈ R d whose entries are given by ‡
Since v FB is deterministic, we deduce that
which confirms that the probability measure P v FB is indeed the optimal measure in the first best. there is only one contractible risk source for simplicity of notation, and because it is also consistent with the "systemic risk -stock index" interpretation. We also consider the case in which none of the risk sources is contractible in a section below.
Second
with σ S a constant. Notice that W 1 t = (W a ) 1 t + b 1 t is a Brownian motion with drift b 1 under all possible choices of P ∈ P, so that the agent's choice does not affect the distribution of the index, only of the output.
We allow the contract payoff to depend both on the output B 1 and W 1 . That is, the principal can offer contract payoffs measurable with respect to F obs T , a sigma-field contained in the filtration F obs := F B 1 ∨ F W 1 generated by (B 1 ,W 1 ), where F B := {F B t } 0≤t≤T is the filtration generated by the output process B. For this reason, we introduce the following vector processes, reflecting the observable and non-observable sources of information.
Incentive compatible contracts
We next need to define the set of admissible contract payoffs. To motivate our definition below, consider the agent's value function ¶ V A t := essup P P ∈P(t,P)
We remark that from this definition we have the following explicit relationship between the payoff and the terminal value of the value function:
The main idea now is to consider the most general representation of the value function V A that we can reasonably expect to have, and then define the admissible contract payoffs via (3.3). With exponential utility, V A T is strictly negative, and can be written in an exponential form. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect from (3.3) that contracts ξ T can be written as a linear combination of various integrals. For example, in the special case d 0 = 0 with no outside contractible variables, we would expect the contracts to be of the type
for some constant C and some adapted processes G,Y, Z. We will admit exactly the contracts of this form, but, due to the insight about the value function V A of the agent that we present next, we will impose some restrictions on what corresponds to process G. We present this reasoning next. ¶ The definition of the value function depends a priori explicitly on the measure P, and we should instead have defined a family (V 
where 0 p,q denotes the p × q matrix of zeros, while Σ ⊥ is defined in the proof of Proposition 2.1 in Appendix. For instance, if we happen to be in the Markov case
obs −− t ), for some smooth function f (t, x, y), so that the dependence of V A on B obs and B obs −− is reduced to the current values B obs a P * −martingale for an optimal measure P * , provided that such an optimizer exists. This is the so-called martingale optimality principle. Writing formally that the drift coefficient of a supermartingale is non-positive, and that of a martingale must vanish, and using the fact that V A < 0, we obtain the following path-dependent HJB (Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman) equation
and
with
Substituting the above into (3.4), it follows that, P − a.s., for every
We then see by directly solving the latter stochastic differential equation that
where
We next recall that the principal must offer a contract based on the information set F obs only.
From the definition of G 1 we can check that the above expression for ξ T does not depend on Γ obs −− , and we expect it also not to depend on Z obs −− , that is, to have Z obs −− = 0. In that case, the contract would be of the form
The above informal discussion suggests the following definition of admissible contracts.
for some constant C, and some pair (Z, Γ) of F obs −predictable function-processes with values in R 2 and S 2 , respectively, satisfying the local square integrability conditions
(ii) A contract is said to be admissible if the corresponding processes Z and Γ satisfy the following:
(C1) For all P ∈ P, there is at least one maximizer
(C2) For all t ∈ [0, T ] there exists a probability measure
(C3) For all t ∈ [0, T ] and P v,a ∈ P, the Doléans-Dade stochastic exponentials
are respectively P −martingales (and not only local martingales), for all P ∈ P(t, P) and a P * martingale.
We denote by C the set of all admissible contracts, and by U the set of the corresponding processes (Z, Γ).
In the last definition, (i) is motivated by the previous discussion, while (ii) is a technical condition needed for the subsequent analysis. In particular, (C1) and (C2) are used to prove the incentive compatibility of contract ξ T , and (C3) will also be used to solve the principal's problem in the next subsection.
We note that in the special case of the standard Holmstrom-Milgrom problem, we would fix the volatility vector v to some constant value v 0 , corresponding to a given reference measure P 0 , and the family P would correspond to measures equivalent to P 0 , because measure P v 0 ,a * (Z,Γ) corresponding to action a * (Z, Γ) is constructed by the usual Girsanov transformation. In this case, condition (C2) would not be needed because it would be automatically satisfied. Moreover, if Z and Γ happen to be deterministic, (and thus v * and a * also), existence of P * in (C2) holds trivially, because it suffices to setṽ * s equal to v * s (Z, Γ), for s ≥ t, and to v s , if s < t. With our admissible contracts, the optimal Z and Γ, will, in fact, be deterministic, and (C2) will be satisfied.
Remark 3.1. In addition to the constant C and the "dt" integral term, the admissible contract is linear (in the integration sense) in the following factors: the contractible variables, that is, the output and the contractible sources of risk; and the quadratic variation and cross-variation processes of the contractible variables. We will see that the optimal contract generally makes use of all of these components. This is to be contrasted with the first best contract in which only the output is used (see also the next subsection), and with the case of controlling the drift only, as in HM (1987). 
for a given function F is an admissible contract. Indeed, consider the PDE, with subscripts denoting partial derivatives, and with
where γ 1 and γ 2 are the diagonal entries of a symmetric matrix γ and γ 3 is the value of the off-diagonal entries,
Then, assuming that the last PDE has a smooth solution (which can guaranteed by some sufficient technical conditions on functions F and G 1 ), it follows from Itô's formula applied to u(t, B 1 t ,W 1 t ) that for all P ∈ P, P − a.s.
The existence of P * is not guaranteed in general, as pointed out in Soner, Touzi and Zhang (2011). Indeed, if it exists, it means that the density of the quadratic variation of B under P * must be equal to
However, it is possible to find a square-integrable process α such that there does not exist a measure P * , satisfying α = α, dt × dP * − a.e. Take, for instance when d = 1, α t := 1 α t ≥2 + 31 α t <2 . Hence, it might be that the above is not an admissible value for α.
Introduce the set of the agent controls that are optimal for maximizing g obs 1 , given Z, Γ: We now show that for given a contract ξ T (Z, Γ) ∈ C, the agent is indifferent between controls
That is, for any t ∈ [0, T ] and any P ∈ P, given the contract
, it is optimal for the agent to choose the corresponding measure Pṽ * (Z,Γ),a * (Z,Γ) in the problem (3.2). Moreover, the corresponding agent's value function satisfies equation (3.7) with (Z obs , Z obs −− ) = (Z, 0), and (Γ obs , Γ obs −− ) = (Γ, 0).
Attainability of first best.
In this section we assume that drift effort a P is uncontrolled by the agent and fixed to the value of zero. We first show that first best is always attainable when the cost function is zero, and then we discuss first best attainability when d = 2, with non-zero cost.
For a pair (Z, Γ) ∈ R 2 × S 2 , we introduce notation
If we choose γ 1 < 0 and assume that the cost k(v, 0) is 0, then it is easy to see that the optimal v * ∈ R d in the definition of G(Z, Γ) is the unique solution of the following equation
where for any 1 ≤ i ≤ d, σ .i is the i-th column of matrix σ . This leads directly to
Now, notice that the principal may choose the values
and arbitrary values for z 2 and γ 3 . Then, this contract is clearly admissible, since Z and Γ are bounded and deterministic, and it follows from (3.10) that when σ = I d , it implements the following optimal volatility
This is exactly equal to the first best volatility v FB obtained in (3.1) when k = 0, as can easily be verified. This result is in agreement with Cadenillas, Cvitanić and Zapatero (2007), who show that in a frictionless and a complete market (i.e., zero cost of effort and the number of Brownian motions equal to the number of observable assets), first best is attainable using a contract that depends only on the final value of the output. Furthermore, with exponential utility functions completeness is not necessary, and a linear contract is optimal. Indeed, with the above z 1 and Γ, we have, setting z 2 = 0,
which is the same as the first best contract when k(v) = 0.
Even with non-zero cost function we would expect first best to be attainable when d = 2, under non-degeneracy conditions. This is because observing W 1 , B 1 , its quadratic variation and their cross-variation, the principal can also observe σ T v 2 and σ .1 · v. We discuss this case below, when we choose k(v, 0) to be a quadratic function.
The principal's problem
Fix an admissible ξ T (Z, Γ) ∈ C and introduce the notation
The principal maximizes the expected utility of her terminal payoff B 1 T − ξ T (Z, Γ). Since the contract ξ T (Z, Γ) is incentive compatible in the sense of Proposition 3.1, the optimal volatility and drift choices by the agent correspond to the probability measures P Z,Γ := Pṽ * (Z,Γ),a * (Z,Γ) for
. Then, assuming that the agent lets the principal choose among the control choices that are optimal for the agent, the principal problem is:
, and substituting the expression for ξ T (Z, Γ), we get
Introduce a vector θ * := σ T v * and denote its first entry θ * 1 , and denote by θ * −1 the (d − 1)-dimensional vector without the first entry. Using condition (C3) in Definition 3.1, and arguing exactly as in the proof of Proposition 3.1 in Appendix, in particular, by isolating a stochastic exponential, it follows that the principal problem reduces to maximizing
Since the supremum in the definition of G obs 1 (Z, Γ) is attained at (v * , a * ), this is equivalent to the minimization problem
If minimizers Z * , Γ * , v * and a * exist, they are then necessarily deterministic, since b, σ and k are non-random. Then, by Proposition 3.1, the contract ξ T (Z * , Γ * ) is incentive compatible for
Moreover, as we have just shown, it is also optimal for the principal's problem, that is, we have proved the following.
Theorem 3.1. Consider the set of admissible contracts ξ T (Z, Γ) ∈ C. Then, the contract that is optimal in that set and provides the agent with expected utility V A 0 < 0 is the one corresponding to Z * , Γ * , v * , a * which are the minimizers in (3.12), provided such minimizers exist and provided ξ T (Z * , Γ * ) ∈ C, and in which the contract cash constant C is given by C := −
Remark 3.3. Notice that, a priori, the optimal contract for the principal's problem is only given under the support of the measure P Z * ,Γ * . However, to be implementable when proposed to the agent, this contract has to be extended to the union of the support of the measures P ∈ P. Since these supports are distinct, such an extension is not necessarily unique, the only restriction being that it has to agree with ξ T (Z * , Γ * ), P Z * ,Γ * − a.s. This degree of freedom could in principle be used to ensure that the contract is indeed incentive-compatible. However, as shown in Proposition 3.1, the form we have chosen for our contracts is tailor-made to retrieve incentive-compatibility by extending the contract without any change. This is an important and convenient aspect of our methodology.
Second-best with non-contractible risks
Consider now the case in which the only contractible process is B 1 . In that case, we need to modify our approach by adopting the following changes, as can be verified using similar arguments. First of all, the principal can now only offer contract payoffs measurable with respect to F B 1 T , a sigmafield contained in the filtration F B 1 := {F B 1 t } 0≤t≤T generated by the output process B 1 .
Following exactly the same intuition from the stochastic control theory as in the previous section, we introduce the function G obs 0 , the counterpart of the function G obs 1 above, defined for any
Once again, if a maximizer exists, we denote it by (v * (z, γ), a * (z, γ)).
We now introduce the set of admissible contracts in this case.
Definition 3.2. (i)
A contract payoff is defined by the F B 1 T −measurable random variable
for some constant C, and some F B 1 −predictable processes Z and Γ with values in R, and satisfying the local square integrability conditions
(C2) For all t ∈ [0, T ] there exists a probability measure P * := Pṽ * (Z,Γ),a * (Z,Γ) ∈ P(t, P), such
(C3) For all t ∈ [0, T ] and P ∈ P, the Doléans-Dade stochastic exponentials
are respectively P −martingales (and not only local martingales), for all P ∈ P(t, P), and a P * -martingale. We denote by C 0 the set of all admissible contracts, and by U 0 the set of the corresponding processes (Z, Γ).
Similarly as before, we introduce the set of controls that are optimal for maximizing g obs 0 , given Z, Γ: The following proposition is the analogue of Proposition 3.1 in this setting, and it can be proved by analogous arguments.
, that is, for any t ∈ [0, T ] and any P ∈ P, given the contract
, it is optimal for the agent to choose the corresponding measure Pṽ
Accordingly, the principal's problem is modified as follows, denoting again for notational simplic-
Similarly, as above, denote by θ * the vector σ T v * . The principal's problem then becomes
(3.14)
Finally, we have Theorem 3.2. Consider the set of admissible contracts ξ 0 T (Z, Γ) ∈ C 0 . Then, the optimal contract that provides the agent with expected utility V A 0 < 0 is the one corresponding to Z * , Γ * , v * , a * which are the minimizers in (3.14), provided such minimizers exist and provided ξ 0 T (Z * , Γ * ) ∈ C 0 , and in which the contract constant C is given by C := − 
General utility functions
We now explain how far we can push the above approach to general utility functions. For simplicity of notation, we only consider the case in which only B 1 is contractible and σ = I d . The principal draws utility U P (B 1 T , ξ T ) and the agent draws utility
Note that now we have the cost outside of the utility function. A possible interpretation is that the function k represents, in a stylized way, joint effects of the risk aversion to the choice of v and a and of their cost. If we define the value function
then we have
Moreover, following exactly the same intuition as above, the process V A t − t 0 k(v P s , a P s )ds is a positive P-supermartingale for any P ∈ P, that can, under regularity (in Dupire's sense) conditions, be written as
where (Z, Γ) is a pair of one-dimensional F B 1 -predictable processes, and
We adopt the following definition of admissible payoffs * * .
Definition 3.3. (i)
18)
for some constant C, and some F B 1 −predictable processes Z and Γ with values in R, satisfying the local square integrability conditions T 0 (|Z t | 2 + |Γ t | 2 )dt < ∞, P−a.s., for all P ∈ P and such that
is the domain of the convex function U −1
A . (ii)
A contract is said to be admissible if the corresponding processes Z and Γ satisfy the following:
(C1) For all P ∈ P, there is at least one maximizer (v * (Z, Γ), a * (Z, Γ)) of g obs 0 (Z, Γ), dt × dPa.e.
(C2) For all t ∈ [0, T ] there exists a probability measure P * := Pṽ * (Z,Γ),a * (Z,Γ) ∈ P(t, P), such that v * (Z, Γ) r = v P * r , dr × P * − a.e. on [t, T ]. * * We note that, depending on the utility function U P of the principal, other technical assumptions on the admissible contracts might be needed in order to solve the principal's problem. However, these have to be treated on a case-bycase basis.
(C3) For all t ∈ [0, T ] and P ∈ P, the following stochastic integral is a true martingale
We denote by C 0 the set of all admissible contracts, and by U 0 the set of the corresponding processes (Z, Γ).
Similarly as before, we introduce the set of controls that are optimal for maximizing g obs 0 , given Z, Γ: Once more, the contracts ξ T are incentive-compatible.
, it is optimal for the agent to choose the corresponding measure Pṽ * (Z,Γ),a * (Z,Γ) in the problem (3.15). Furthermore, V A has the dynamics (3.17).
Then, using the analogous notation as in the previous sections, the problem of the principal takes the following form
The difficulty is that, in general, it would be hard to solve the above maximization problem. † †
Quadratic penalty and numerical examples
Consider now the case in which σ is an identity matrix, the control a P is fixed to the value of zero and
Thus, it is costly to move the volatility v i away from α i , and the cost intensity is β i . An interpretation is that α i are the initial risk exposures of the firm at the time the manager starts his contract. † † One tractable case might be the one of maximizing expected value of the utility of the form U P (B T / ξ T ) when both the agent's and the principal's utilities are of CRRA type.
Case I: Contractible Risk
Suppose W 1 is observable and can be contracted upon. In this case,
Note that if, for some i, we have Γ B − β i > 0, then the agent chooses optimally |v * i (Z, Γ)| = ∞. However, this cannot be optimal for the principal, as it can be seen from (3.12) that in that case the principal's utility is at its minimum. Thus, we can optimize under the constraint Γ B − min j β j ≤ 0. Assuming first Γ B − β i < 0, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d, the supremum of g obs 1 is attained (uniquely) at
From (3.12), the principal's problem is to maximize
which is the same as maximizing
It remains to consider the case Γ B − β i = 0 for some i. Assume that b j = 0 for j which attains the minimum in min i β i . Then, if Z B = 0, the agent chooses optimally |v * i (Z, Γ)| = ∞, which cannot be optimal for the principal. The only remaining case is Γ B − β j = 0 for some j and Z B = 0. In this case, the agent is indifferent with respect to the choice of v j , and thus the principal has to maximize over all admissible values of v j (in addition to over Z, Γ, including the terms v * i (Z, Γ)
for i for which Γ B = β i ), and she has to compare that maximum to the maximum associated with optimizing (4.1). ‡ ‡
The case d = 2
If d = 2, since W 1 is observed, then also the covariation between W 1 and B 1 is observed, which means that v P 1 is observed. Since also the quadratic variation is observed, then |v P 2 | is observed, and we would expect the first best to be attainable. Recall that v * (Z, Γ) is obtained by maximizing
Assume, for example, that b 2 = 0. Suppose the principal sets
Note that here the principal defines Γ BW 1 in a feedback form, that is, it explicitly depends on v 1 . It can be checked that our results hold also if we change the definition of G obs 1 so that the maximization over v takes into account that Γ BW 1 = Γ BW 1 (v 1 ) depends explicitly on v 1 . In that case, as can be readily verified, the agent's optimization objective g obs 1 is independent of v 1 , v 2 , and the agent would be indifferent between any values of those, and the principal would ask him to use the first best.
However, as we will see in the theorem below, first best is not always attainable in our framework, in which we take Z, Γ as being fixed (even if they depend on v 1 ), when we perform maximization of function g obs 1 .
More precisely, we now show that in the case d = 2 and two observable sources of risk, B 1 and W 1 , first best will be attainable using our admissible contracts, leading to constant Z, Γ, if the optimal unconstrained Γ B satisfies the constraint Γ B < min i {β i }. We also show that there are parameter cases in which the latter is not the case, and our admissible contracts do not lead to first best, even though first best is attainable within a wider family of contracts as discussed above. 
is incentive compatible, using a contract with Z B = Z FB , Z W 1 = 0 and Γ B < min{β 1 , β 2 }. In this case, first best is attainable. However, the contract generically still has to be offered with the quadratic variation ‡ ‡ This assumes that the latter maximum is attained. We provide some sufficient conditions for this in Appendix.
Numerically, the search for the maximizers converged in all the computations we performed. and covariation components in it. More precisely, for the optimal contract we have,
(iii) With d = 2, there are also parameter values for which v 1 = v FB 1 , v 2 = v FB 2 cannot be made incentive compatible using our admissible contracts, because of the constraint Γ B < min{β 1 , β 2 }. For those values, first best is not attainable with our admissible contracts.
Case II: Non-contractible Risk
Suppose W 1 cannot be contracted upon.
Assume that b j = 0 for j which attains the minimum in min i β i . As above, if for some i, we have Γ − β i > 0, or Γ − β i = 0, but Z = 0, then the agent chooses optimally |v * i (Z, Γ)| = ∞, which cannot be optimal for the principal. Thus, we can optimize under the constraint Γ − min j β j ≤ 0. Assume first Γ − β i < 0 for all i. Then, the supremum in the definition of function G is attained at
From (3.14), the principal's problem is then to maximize
We need to compare that maximum to the remaining case in which Γ − β i = 0 for some i and Z = 0, in which case the principal has to maximize over all admissible values of v i , because the agent is indifferent among those. (i) We have seen in the previous section that the principal cannot always attain the first best expected utility value within our set of admissible contracts, even when that would be possible if we allowed a wider family of contracts. We conjecture that in the case in which the number of contractible variables, including B 1 , is strictly less than the number of risk sources (Brownian motions), the principal could not increase her optimal utility by using contracts outside of our admissible class.
(ii) In Proposition 6.1 in Appendix, we state sufficient conditions on the parameters of the model which ensure that there always exists at least one maximizer of (4.2), so that the verification type Theorem 3.2 can be applied in this setting.
Numerical Comparative Statics
We present here comparative statics, obtained numerically, in which we vary one of the following four variables, R A , b 2 , β 2 , α 2 , and we keep the other three variables equal to their benchmark values. We set d = 2, in which case if W 1 is contractible the principal can attain the first best, so we consider only the case of non-contractible risk W 1 .
We pick the benchmark parameter values as follows:
The logic behind this choice is the following:
-R A > R P : The agent is much more risk averse than the principal. This is a standard assumption in applications in which the principal is a group of shareholders, assumed well diversified.
-β 2 > β 1 : It may be harder to change the exposure to one kind of risk than to the other, for example to the firm specific risk that is very weakly correlated to other risks in the economy.
-α 2 > α 1 : The initial exposure to such specific risk is higher than the initial exposure to the other risk.
-b 2 > b 1 : This is somewhat arbitrary; for example, it would be the case with a hedge fund diversifying between an asset driven by W 1 correlated to the market risk, and an asset driven by W 2 uncorrelated or very weakly correlated to the market risk and offering a higher risk premium than the first asset.
In case d = 2, the optimization problem (4.2) is to maximize
Since β 1 < β 2 , the remaining case is when Γ = β 1 , Z = 0, in which case the principal maximizes the following over v 1 ,
and the maximum of this has to be compared to the maximum of (4.3).
Numerical results are shown in Figures 1-10 . We draw the following conclusions from those:
General implications.
-The second best contract sensitivity Z with respect to output B 1 is always higher than its first best version. That, is, with moral hazard the agent has to be given higher incentives. However, the difference between the two is typically small, with one exception: in Figure 3 , when initially risk exposure α 2 is very low, Z is much higher than its first best version. We offer the following explanation: the firm starts being mostly exposed to risk of W 1 and the agent is reluctant to go very high with the other risk exposure because of the high cost (see Figure 4) . Thus, the principal is forced to give higher incentives.
-The optimal risk exposures (volatilities) in the second best in most cases follow relatively closely those of the first best. The difference is more discernible in Figure 8 , when risk premia b 2 and b 1 are more apart. That is, when the risk premium from one risk is very different from the risk premium from the other risk, the agent tries to take advantage of that by active volatilities selection, that may deviate noticeably from the first best even under the optimal contract. Notice, however, that this explanation is not completely one-to-one with the outcomes, in the sense that the minimum discrepancy between the first best and second best volatilities is not attained when we have b 1 exactly equal to b 2 .
-There are cases when the second best risk exposures are higher than the first best ones, but also cases when they are lower.
Let us now comment on the different figures - Figure 1 . All the contract sensitivities are decreasing in agent's risk aversion, as one would have expected.
- Figure 2 . All the volatilities are decreasing in agent's risk aversion, as one would have expected.
- Figure 3 . Except for low α 2 , we see that the sensitivities with respect to output do not vary much with α 2 , that is, when varying the initial "natural" exposure to risk of W 2 . On the other hand, the sensitivity with respect to quadratic variation decreases relatively sharply with α 2 : more extreme values of the initial exposure to that risk make the principal use quadratic variation more as an incentive tool; for its low initial values she wants to increase the risk exposure by rewarding higher variation (the sensitivity is positive), and for its high values she wants to decrease it by penalizing high variation (the sensitivity is negative).
- Figure 4 . Not surprisingly, higher initial natural exposure α 2 to risk of W 2 implies that the agent, because it is costly to deviate too much therefrom, chooses higher optimal corresponding exposure v 2 . On the other hand, this results in the agent compensating by choosing lower second best exposure v 1 to the other risk, when α 2 is high enough. The difference in the first and second best exposure v 2 is not very discernible, except when α 2 is very low: in that case, the cost of having v 2 depart from α 2 leads to the agent choosing v 2 very low, too, and below the first best level.
- Figures 5 and 6 . Neither the first best nor the second best output sensitivity, nor the volatilities change much with cost intensity β 2 . Quadratic variation sensitivity changes somewhat, and in a non-monotonic way.
- Figure 7 . Quadratic variation sensitivity increases with risk premium b 2 , to provide incentives for choosing higher exposure to the corresponding risk.
- Figure 8 . As expected, higher b 2 implies higher exposure v 2 to the corresponding risk. It also increases second best exposure v 1 to the other risk. This is because incentives for increasing v 2 are partly given via quadratic variation, which also rewards higher v 1 .
-Relative loss in utility. In the last two figures we plot the percentage loss in the principal's second best utility certainty equivalent relative to the first best. The relative loss is very small for the benchmark parameter values when we vary R A or β 2 (figures not provided). Figure 9 shows that the loss can be significant for extreme values of initial exposure α 2 , from about 6% for low α 2 to, very large values for high α 2 . That is, when an initial risk exposure is far from desirable, the moral hazard cost of providing incentives to the agent to modify the exposure is high. In Figure 10 , we see that the loss is very high for very low values of the risk premium b 2 , and it is also not negligible for very low values of b 2 . That is, when the benefit of being exposed to a risk is very low or very high, the moral hazard cost of providing proper incentives to the agent to invest appropriately in that risk is high.
Conclusions
We build a framework for studying moral hazard in dynamic risk management, using recently developed mathematical techniques. While those allow us to solve the problem in which utility is drawn solely from terminal payoff, we leave for a future paper the work on the case of a similar problem on infinite horizon with inter-temporal payments. In the case of terminal payoff, we find in the present paper that the optimal contract is implemented by compensation based on the output, its quadratic variation (corresponding in practice to the sample variance used when computing Sharpe ratios), the contractible sources of risk, and the cross-variations between the output and the risk sources. (Or, it could be implemented by derivatives that provide such payoffs.) When the problem with inter-temporal payments will have been solved, it will be interesting to see which financial instruments are needed to implement the optimal contract in that case. In our framework it is assumed that the principal knows the model parameters (for example, the mean return rates and the variance-covariance matrix of the returns of the assets the hedge fund manager is investing in). In practice, the principal may not have that information, and it would be of interest to extend the model to include this adverse selection problem.
Appendix

Technical proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Let us consider the following family of processes, indexed by v ∈
and where 0 p,q denotes the p × q matrix of zeros. Furthermore,
We then set P m to be the set of probability measures P v ∈ M(Ω) of the form
We recall that by Bichteler (1981) , we can also define a pathwise version of the quadratic variation process B and of its density process with respect to the Lebesgue measure, a positive symmetric matrix α:
The family P m is non-dominated and its different elements account for the possible choices of the volatility vector v by the agent. This family could also be described more precisely by considering all the choices of volatility vector v for which there exists at least one strong solution to a SDE (see Soner, Touzi and Zhang (2011)) or equivalently to some martingale problem (see Kazi-Tani, Possamaï and Zhou (2013) or Neufeld and Nutz (2014) ). We emphasize that by definition, we have
The law of (B, α ) under
This implies in particular, that the process
is a R d -valued, P-Brownian motion, for every P ∈ P m § § . Then, according to Lemma 2.2 in Soner,
In particular, this implies that the canonical process B admits the following dynamics, for every v ∈ H 2 (R d , P 0 ),
Thus, the first coordinate of the canonical process is the desired output process, observed by both the principal and the agent, the following d 0 coordinates represent the contractible sources of risk, while the remaining ones represent the factors that are not observable (or contractible) by the principal.
The introduction of the control process a can now be done by using the usual Girsanov trans- § § Notice that we should actually have considered a family (W P ) P∈P m , since the stochastic integral in (6.3) is, a priori, only defined P-a.s. However, we can use recent results by Nutz (2012) to provide an aggregated version of this family, which is the process we denote by W . We emphasize that this result only holds under a "good" choice of set theoretic axioms that we will refrain from detailing here.
formations, because it only appears in the drift of the output process. We define for any P ∈ P m
where b is a fixed vector in R d . Next, we set
Therefore, for any P ∈ P, we can associate a unique pair
, and we can use the notation P v,a . Next, by Girsanov theorem, the following process W a is a
Notice in particular that we have
Then, by (6.4), we have 5) which can then be rewritten as 6) where for any
Notice then that, for a given measure P ∈ P, according to (6.6), we can always find two ddimensional vectors v P and a P such that
which gives us the following correspondence
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Let (Z, Γ) be an arbitrary pair process in U, and consider the agent's problem with contract ξ (Z, Γ):
, P − a.s., for all P ∈ P.
Our objective is to solve explicitly this problem. We first compute directly for all P ∈ P(t, P) that
where ξ t (Z, Γ) is defined exactly as ξ T (Z, Γ) by substituting t for T . By admissibility condition (C2) of Definition 3.1, we may define a probability measureP equivalent to P via the density dP /dP
, and by the arbitrariness of P ∈ P(t, P), it follows that V A t (ξ (Z, Γ)) ≤ −e −R A ξ t (Z,Γ) . Finally, by admissibility condition (C1) in Definition 3.1, we see that the measure P * attains the last bound, since G obs 1 (Z r , Γ r ) = g obs 1 (Z r , Γ r , v P * r , a P * r ), P * −a.s. Hence,
, and the proof is complete. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Let (Z, Γ) ∈ U 0 and consider ξ T (Z, Γ) as defined in (3.18) . Fix some P ∈ P. With such a contract, the problem of the agent becomes
where we used the fact that
is a true martingale, since (Z, Γ) ∈ U 0 . Moreover, this upper bound can clearly be attained when choosing P ≡ P * , since by definition, we have G 0 = g 0 under this probability measure. We therefore have proved that, for any P ∈ P 
Then, the first order condition for Z W 1 is
and for v 1 is
From the above, we get
(ii) The first order condition with respect to Γ B is, after some calculations,
The first order condition with respect to Z B is, similarly,
When d = 2, using the FOC (6.8) for Γ B , we obtain directly that, if b 2 Z B + α 2 β 2 = 0 and b 2 + α 2 β 2 = 0,
Note that (6.7) implies that if optimal Z B is equal to its first-best value, then automatically optimal Z W 1 is, too, Z W 1 = 0. Plugging these values for Z B and Z W 1 in (6.9) and using (6.10), it can be readily verified that, indeed, the first best Z FB = R P R A +R P solves the FOC (6.9) when d = 2. We can then compute
We see that Γ B + R A (Z B ) 2 = 0 only if we happen to have Z B = 1. Similarly, Γ BW 1 is not zero, except for special sets of parameter values. Next, we can compute
Thus, indeed, first best v FB 1 and v FB 2 satisfy the FOC's of the principal. Setting Γ W 1 = 0, the corresponding contract is, a posteriori, given by
Thus, if the above value of Γ B satisfies Γ B < min i {β i }, then first best values v FB 1 and v FB 2 are implementable, and because the corresponding contract is of the same form as the first best contract, ξ T = const. + Z B B T , the principal's maximal utility will be equal to its first value, if we fix the agent's utility to his reservation value.
(iii) The first best contract is of the form ξ FB T = Z FB B T +(1−Z FB )k(v FB )T +S FB for a constant S FB , so that, with the agent's reservation utility being V A 0 , we have
to attain first best, we need to have the corresponding principal's certainty equivalents (CE's) equal. The certainty equivalent of the first best is given by, setting, without loss of generality, V A 0 = 0,
The principal's certainty equivalent of the second best is given by
which is equal to
Given constant Z, Γ, for a constant volatility pair (v 1 , v 2 ) to be optimal, we need to have either that it is equal to (v * 1 (Z, Γ), v * 2 (Z, Γ)), or we have Z = 0, Γ = min i {β i }. Consider first the former case, in which we get v * i from the agent's FOC's. It is straightforward to check that the principal's problem cannot obtain its maximum over (Z B , Z W 1 , v 1 , Γ B ) at the boundaries (±∞, ±∞, ±∞, min i {β i }) of its domain (similarly as in the proof of Proposition 6.1 below). Thus, the maximum is attained at the interior values that satisfy the principal's FOC's. We know then from part (i) of the present proof that v 1 = v FB 1 and Z W 1 = (Z FB − Z B )v 1 . Thus, after cancellations involving v 1 terms, the first best and the second best will be equal iff This implies that the value of Γ B that satisfies the FOC's is the one in (6.11). Notice then that we necessarily have Γ B < β 2 , the only constraint which may not be satisfied being Γ B < β 1 . And, indeed, there are parameter values for which
For example, this will be the case if we take α 2 and R P R A +R P small enough, because then Γ B gets closer to β 2 . Thus, with those parameter values, there are no solutions to the FOC's for which Γ B < β 1 and for which the corresponding principal's utility is equal to the first best.
Finally, let us consider the case in which β 1 < β 2 , Z B = 0, Γ B = β 1 . Then, v 1 can be anything, and v 2 = α 2 β 2 /(β 2 − β 1 ). We see that CE FB = CE SB iff
For example, for α 2 = 0, hence also v 2 = 0, having the CE's equal gives us
Then, for example for b 1 = 0, and large enough b 2 , the left-hand side will be positive, while the right-hand side will be negative, and the equality cannot be satisfied. Since such parameter values are not contradictory to the above choice in which the FOC's solution cannot attain first best, we conclude that there are parameter values for which attaining first best is impossible. 
